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RESUMEN 
Muchos filósofos son muy optimistas respecto de la contribución cognitiva de la 
ficción a la ciencia y a la filosofía. Aquí, me concentro en un caso de estudio: la explica-
ción que dan Ichikawa y Jarvis de los experimentos de pensamiento en términos de las 
historias de ficción ordinarias. En la medida en que la contribución de la ficción no es al-
go sui generis, el procesamiento de la ficción será a menudo parásito de la las capacidades 
cognitivas que pueden reemplazarla; en la medida en que es sui generis, nada garantiza que 
la ficción se comporta suficientemente bien para acatar las constricciones del discurso del 
discurso científico y filosófico, por no hablar de los requisitos mínimos de coherencia 
conceptual y lógica. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: experimento de pensamiento, ficción, narrativa, necesidad, Gettier, contrafáctico, 
como si, fingir, historia. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many philosophers are very sanguine about the cognitive contributions of fiction 
to science and philosophy. I focus on a case study: Ichikawa and Jarvis’s account of 
thought experiments in terms of everyday fictional stories. As far as the contribution of 
fiction is not sui generis, processing fiction often will be parasitic on cognitive capacities 
which may replace it; as far as it is sui generis, nothing guarantees that fiction is sufficiently 
well-behaved to abide by the constraints of scientific and philosophical discourse, not 
even by the minimum requirements of conceptual and logical coherence. 
 
KEYWORDS: Thought Experiment, Fiction, Narrative, Possibility, Necessity, Gettier, Counterfactual, 
As If, Pretense, Story. 
 
 
I. THE PURPORTED CONTRIBUTION OF FICTION 
 
Fiction thrives in contemporary philosophy. Fictionalism looms 
large in discussing morals, modals, models, and so on. I distinguish two 
ways of using fiction. The first is cognitively highly regimented, subject 
to constant monitoring. In particular, it is constrained by the full appa-
ratus of logics, mathematics, and scientific knowledge. One handy exam-
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ple is fictionalism about mathematical objects, aiming only at minimising 
ontological commitments. One adds a fictionality operator, the intended 
effect being that one’s commitments to numbers and so on do not 
‘count’ in the same way as one’s commitments to actual objects. It is an 
intriguing question how fictionalism relates to everyday fiction. Anyway 
this is not my topic in this paper.  
I want to focus on the second use of fiction: use of ordinary stories 
in science and philosophy. By ‘ordinary’ I do not mean that the story 
must be commonplace but that there is no special philosophical regi-
mentation as in fictionalism about some region of discourse. One takes 
some piece of scientific discourse and treats it as a story. There are pieces 
of scientific discourse which surely are amenable to being treated as sto-
ries, among them scientific thought experiments like Schrödinger’s cat:  
 
One can even set up quite burlesque cases. A cat is penned up in a steel 
chamber, along with the following device (which must be secured against 
direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter, there is a tiny bit of ra-
dioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the hour one 
of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it 
happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a ham-
mer that shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this en-
tire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if 
meanwhile no atom has decayed. The psi-function of the entire system 
would express this by having in it the living and dead cat (pardon the ex-
pression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts. [Schrödinger (1935), p. 157, 
translation slightly revised] 
 
Though Schrödinger uses many scientific terms in a highly regi-
mented way, his example would not have achieved notoriety without its 
‘burlesque’ character: it can be read not only as a nomically possible sce-
nario that exemplifies certain quantum phenomena but also as an enter-
taining science fiction short story. Though features like being burlesque 
or entertaining are not essential to fiction, everyday fictional stories are 
often crafted to display them.  
There is a widespread tendency to think that thought experiments 
play an important role both in philosophy and science, and that this role 
is precisely due to features which they share with ordinary fictional sto-
ries, and which distinguish them from – in a sense – more rigorous 
forms of scientific discourse. Among these features which are typical for 
fictional stories (albeit not confined to story-telling) are pretense [Nichols 
and Stich (2000)], use of narrative patterns and certain modes of presen-
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tation like metaphorical speech. Many philosophers credit these features 
with a special cognitive significance for scientific and philosophical in-
quiry [Camp (2009), p. 128], and especially for the scientific and philo-
sophical practice of thought experimenting [Gendler (2007), p. 69]. Some 
even claim that (at least some) thought experiments (at least partly) are 
fictions, and that their cognitive significance is (at least partly) due to 
their being fictions [Carroll (2002), Meynell (2014)]. I shall consider one 
particular attempt to give everyday fictional stories a key role in pro-
cessing a successful and significant philosophical thought experiment. I 
shall argue that this attempt is not successful, and that the problems it 
suffers from cast some general doubts on other attempts at using every-
day fiction in scientific and philosophical inquiry. 
 
 
II. AN EXEMPLUM CRUCIS 
 
I choose an example of using fiction for the purposes of philosoph-
ical thought experiment from the literature. This example excels in being 
both more cautious and more precise than many of the usual appeals to 
everyday fiction. If the approach considered has difficulties, less elabo-
rated ones are likely to have difficulties, too, but it will prove harder to 
bring out these difficulties clearly. I frame my considerations as an explor-
ative meta-thought experiment: the general claim that fiction plays a 
genuine cognitive role is confronted with a test case.  
My test case comes up in the context of a general metaphilosophical 
debate on how to formalise thought experiments like the Gettier experi-
ment. Here is a paradigmatic Gettier scenario: 
 
Tl At 8:28, somebody looked at a clock to see what time it was. The clock 
was broken; it had stopped exactly twenty-four hours previously. The sub-
ject believed, on the basis of the clock’s reading, that it was 8:28. [William-
son (2009), p. 467] 
 
Scenarios of this sort have convinced many philosophers that knowledge 
cannot be defined as justified true belief. In modal terms, it is not the 
case that knowledge is necessarily justified true belief. For the subject in 
the scenario intuitively has justified true belief but no knowledge 
(NKJTB) that it is 8:28. 
Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis propose to regard Gettier 
scenarios like Tl as everyday literary fictions. Let g be the proposition that 
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every element of the set of fictional truths in the Tl-story is true (not just 
fictionally, true tout court). Then the Gettier argument can be resumed 
thus:  
 
(1p) Possibly, g. 
 
(2p) Necessarily, if g, then someone has NKJTB. 
 
Therefore: (3p) Possibly, someone has NKJTB. [cf. Ichikawa and 
Jarvis (2009), p. 229] 
 
Ichikawa and Jarvis see a strong connection between a suitable story and 
modal truth. But they are cautious. A set of truth-conditions is extracted 
from the story as corresponding to what is fictional. Then these truth-
conditions are used to delimit a situation. The claim that this situation is 
possible must be established independently.  
Ichikawa and Jarvis’s use of fiction is designed to solve the problem 
of deviant realisations, which has been introduced by Timothy Williamson. 
Normal Gettier descriptions like T1 can be realised in a way which is de-
viant, i.e. does not serve as a counterexample as intended:  
 
... Tl conjoined with the originally unintended T2 no longer works as a 
Gettier case: T2 The subject knew in advance that the clock had stopped 
exactly twenty-four hours previously. [Williamson (2009), p. 467] 
 
So how are the right possible situations confined? Williamson himself 
famously proposed a counterfactual analysis. Roughly, if Tl had been ac-
tual, someone would have had NKJTB. However, it has been noted that 
the counterfactual analysis falls prey to the epistemic possibility that a 
deviant realisation is actual. Someone may actually instantiate Tl and T2. 
In that case the counterfactual might be false. But the thought experi-
ment does not seem to depend on what is actually the case [Ichikawa 
(2009), Malmgren (2011)].  
Ichikawa and Jarvis introduce fiction in order to select the non-
deviant realisations of the Gettier scenario. In dealing with fictions we 
eschew deviant background conditions like T2. T2 is not true in a Tl-
fiction. Thus, Ichikawa and Jarvis say, our competence of evaluating eve-
ryday fictions allows us to single out the non-deviant possible situations 
the Gettier argument aims at. Ichikawa and Jarvis do not say much to mo-
tivate that the content of a Gettier fiction excludes deviant realisations. 
They rely on our competence to tell what is true in a fiction. For any par-
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ticular deviant realisation one may come up with, we can tell that it is not 
true in the fiction. I am willing to grant this claim. If it is denied, we have 
even more reason to doubt the purported cognitive role of fiction. 
Fiction is introduced into the thought experiment to deal with the 
problem of deviant realisations. Ichikawa and Jarvis are especially cau-
tious in not letting fictional content but only the normal proposition g 
enter the Gettier argument. In the most cautious understanding of g, 
there is a one-to-one mapping from the set of fictional truths to some set 
of normal propositions. Proposition g says that the propositions in the 
latter set are true. We do not have to presuppose that the fictional truths 
are normal propositions.1 This is an attractive feature for my case study; 
if the cautious approach leads to difficulties, any approach which directly 
inserts the content of the fiction into some philosophical argument is 
likely to lead to the same difficulties. For instance, it is argued that fiction 
serves to test our conceptual commitments [Carroll (2002)]. In order to 
do so, fiction must reliably preserve conceptual content. My case study 
shows that we cannot even rely on this minimum requirement. 
One may question the significance of my case study. Ichikawa and 
Jarvis do not aim at establishing the general claim that fiction is cogni-
tively useful in science and philosophy. Yet they are committed to the 
claim that using fiction is the best general way to deal with deviant reali-
sations of thought experiments. Fixing thought experimental intuitions 
seems an especially important task. Moreover, we will see that the prob-
lems with the exemplary task generalise to other uses of fiction. My case 
study is not taken from the theory of fiction but from philosophical 
practice. In order to assess the general claim that fiction is cognitively 
useful, we should consider where fiction is actually used. It is highly sig-
nificant to observe fiction actually being used for a well-defined theoreti-
cal purpose instead of merely speculating from a meta-perspective what 
fiction might be used for. I take Ichikawa and Jarvis’s account to be a 
prime example of such a use (though I doubt their account of the role of 
fiction in thought experiments). My case study shares the limits of any 
case study. It might not be fully generalisable. If fiction fails with respect 
to the task considered, it may still be useful for others.  
I shall consider two alternatives, depending on whether or not the 
contribution of everyday fiction to some cognitive endeavour, broadly 
understood, is sui generis. By sui generis I mean that processing fiction is 
more efficient in making this contribution than any alternative deploy-
ment of cognitive capacities. I do not claim that the contribution is due 
to essential features of fiction. Often the contribution of fiction is not sui 
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generis because it is parasitic on an ‘off-line’ use of cognitive capacities 
which are also used in dealing with the actual world. Then there is no 
reason why one should be expected to dwell on fiction rather than di-
rectly using the underlying cognitive capacities. If the contribution is sui 
generis, however, it will often be so because fiction is not regimented in 
the way required by philosophical and scientific inquiry. Then it is doubt-
ful that the contribution will lead to the expected cognitive achievement. 
My first point (III.1) will elaborate on the first alternative, while my oth-
er two points (III.2-III.3) will elaborate on the second alternative. 
 
 
III. CRITICISM 
 
III.1 Fiction as an Epistemic Detour 
 
My first criticism targets the special epistemic significance of fic-
tion. Fiction is often vaguely credited with promoting ‘understanding’ or 
‘explanation’ [Camp (2009), pp. 127-28]. I do not deny that it may con-
tribute in its own way to cognitive achievements. Yet the question one 
would have to address is whether there is anything about a cognitive en-
deavour that makes fiction especially suited to promote it, compared to a 
more direct approach to real or possible scenarios. Use of epistemic ca-
pacities ‘off-line’, say within a game of pretense, will often be parasitic on 
their ‘on-line’ use in dealing with real scenarios. Fiction is dispensable as 
far as one might as well directly use the capacities which underlie our 
dealing with fiction. When fiction is dispensable, we may doubt that it is 
used at all. The general suspicion that fiction is an idle wheel is illustrated 
by my case study. It could be dispelled by presenting a genuine function 
of fiction in philosophical inquiry which is not parasitic on the use of 
cognitive capacities outside of fiction. But here the burden of proof is on 
the part of the advocate of fiction.  
An exemplary target which makes this principled criticism more 
concrete is Ichikawa and Jarvis’s claim that in dealing with fictions, we 
discard deviant background conditions. If we are able to know (1p) and 
(2p), the premisses of the Gettier argument à la Ichikawa and Jarvis, we 
must at least in principle be able to disentangle deviant and non-deviant 
background conditions. The problem is not that we cannot refer to the 
right situations by using g, the proposition fixed by the fiction, but that 
we cannot know that these situations are NKJTB-situations without hav-
ing an independent access to them. We must have a suitable grip on what 
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all the T1-scenarios under discussion are like to see that they are all 
NKJTB-scenarios. One may deny that this issue is to be settled by the 
capacity of evaluating fiction. But whatever additional capacity takes 
over, it must allow to consider precisely the scenarios selected by the fic-
tion. I do not see how this condition could be guaranteed to be met un-
less evaluating fiction piggybacks on an independent cognitive capacity 
of considering precisely the right situations. Frank Jackson hints at such 
a capacity when he compares thought experiments to cooking recipes: 
 
we make an assumption akin to that we make when we follow a cooking 
recipe. Cooking recipes don’t tell you what not to do. They couldn’t. There 
are infinitely many things not to do (don’t add bats wings, don’t arrange 
for the power to be turned off, don’t burn the house down, ...). They tell 
you what to do, and rely on your having an implicit grasp of an ‘and that’s 
all’ clause. The same goes for described possible cases. They are given in a 
relatively small number of words. This of necessity leaves many things 
open. Those presenting the cases rely on hearers having an implicit grasp 
of the range of cases being presented [Jackson (2011), p. 478]  
 
Assume for the sake of argument that a ‘that’s all’-clause is all that it 
takes to get rid of deviant realisations. The corresponding feature of fic-
tion is the incompleteness of fictional stories. For instance, there is no 
number n such that it is true in Nabokov’s Lolita that n people were born 
in Paris in 1910 [cf. Woodward (2012)]. Analogously, the T1-story may 
be incomplete with respect to T2 and other deviant realisations. It is nei-
ther true that, in the T1-fiction, T2, nor is it true that, in the T1-fiction, 
not T2. In contrast, possible worlds are taken to be complete: for any 
proposition p and any world w, either p is true or it is false at w. Hence, if 
we just take the worlds where what is true in the T1-fiction is true, we do 
not thereby exclude the T2-worlds. Ichikawa and Jarvis would need a 
recipe what to do with things that are indeterminate in the fiction. Thus, 
a ‘that’s all’-clause won’t do. 
I do not think anyway that a ‘that’s all’-clause could take care of de-
viant ways of fleshing out a scenario. For there are things one must do 
without being explicitly told so: before cooking, ensure that the power is 
turned on. In a similar vein, there are untold things we must assume for 
the T1-scenario to work: clocks are good indicators of time. Jackson’s 
analogy to the cooking recipe raises the question of how we tell apart 
deviant and normal ways of following the recipe. A proposal analogous 
to Ichikawa and Jarvis’s theory would be that we dwell on a literary fic-
tion of cooking to figure out how to implement the recipe. But this 
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seems preposterous. We usually do not need a fiction to fix the content 
of a cooking recipe (i.e. what is and what is not to be done according to 
the recipe). We rely on an implicit sense of normalcy. In processing fic-
tion, we also deploy a normalcy heuristic, but deploying a normalcy heu-
ristic does not depend on fiction. The delicate and ill-understood 
capacity of telling apart normal from deviant circumstances plays a great 
role in everyday life. And invoking fiction in order to use this capacity 
seems to be an unnecessary detour. There are other ways of explicitly 
imposing normalcy conditions, for instance ‘ceteris paribus’, ‘normally’. 
The Gettier argument becomes: let g be the proposition that anything 
that is normally the case in a T1-scenario is true.  
 
(1n) Possibly, g.  
 
(2n) Necessarily, if g, then someone has NKJTB. 
 
Therefore: (3n) Possibly, someone has NKJTB. 
 
The normalcy clause performs the task the fiction is supposed to per-
form.2 
To summarise: in order to bring out the special epistemic role of 
fiction, we should ask in how far its exploits are genuine or parasitic on 
more mundane epistemic capacities. 
 
III.2 Narrative Persuasion vs. Argument 
 
A standard objection against the cognitive role of fiction is No Argument: 
neither artworks nor discourse about them are bound to provide argu-
ments for claims about the world [Carroll (2002), p. 6, Lamarque and Ol-
sen (1994), pp. 332-3]. No Argument is only half of the truth. The other 
half is that fiction is highly sensitive to certain mechanisms of persuasion 
which do not abide by scientific standards. According to recent research 
on narrative transportation, emotions of empathy and imagery elicited by a 
story dispose the audience to get detached from actuality and immersed 
into fictive scenarios [Van Laer et al. (2014), Liao and Doggett (2014)]. 
One’s engagement with fiction tends to have a persuasive impact on 
one’s view of the actual world, even when the story itself is not overtly 
persuasive. This persuasive role of narratives often does not conform to 
scientific and philosophical standards of reflectively controlled methodi-
cal reasoning. I do not dismiss narrative transportation as irrational. It 
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simply is not in the business of providing well-regimented philosophical 
arguments. David Velleman introduces a corresponding notion of narra-
tive (pseudo-)explanation (‘Aha! Of course!’, [(2003), p. 21]). As an ex-
ample, he presents a story where an usurper is crushed by a statue of his 
predecessor. We tend to perceive the usurper’s death as a punishment 
caused by his misdeed. Of course, this may be explained by conventions 
of poetic justice, but one may be subliminally tempted to project corre-
sponding pseudo-explanatory relationships into similar actual events. 
Narrative explanation is not confined to fiction, but everyday fictional 
stories are especially amenable to it. 
Velleman’s example can be used to illustrate the problem for treat-
ing philosophical scenarios as fictions. Given normal conventions of sto-
ry-telling, it is not absurd to read the pseudo-explanation into the 
usurper story. In this reading, it is true in the story that the usurper was 
punished according to some natural mechanism of poetic justice. But if 
we were to read the story as a philosophical thought experiment, we 
should be more careful. For instance, there are doubts whether such a 
mechanism is metaphysically possible. The usurper story is no philo-
sophical thought experiment. Still it illustrates how narrative persuasion 
may lead to unexpected differences between a scenario treated as a phil-
osophical thought experiment and as an everyday fiction. Due to these 
differences, one cannot simply take for granted that treating a scenario as 
a fiction will yield the set of possibilities intended by the thought exper-
imenter. The fission scenario to be considered in the next section will 
further illustrate the point.  
 
III.3 Fictional Content Is Not Guaranteed to Be Well-Behaved 
 
The argument from narrative explanation gave rise to the suspicion 
that the fiction carves out the wrong set of possibilities instead of those 
relevant to a corresponding thought experiment. The argument to come 
leads to a similar conclusion by more generally addressing the restrictions 
imposed on fictional content by its purported use in philosophy. Ichika-
wa and Jarvis’s account presupposes that there is a precise correspond-
ence between the set of fictional truths and the set of possible situations 
relevant to a corresponding thought experiment. This presupposition is 
not supported by the extant accounts of truth in fiction mentioned by 
Ichikawa and Jarvis [Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013), p. 265]. In Lewis’s 
(1983) counterfactual analysis, roughly p is true in a fiction iff it is true in 
the closest world where the story is told as known fact (variant: ... and 
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the common beliefs of the community of origin are true). However, 
Ichikawa and Jarvis motivate their fictional account precisely by the fail-
ure of Williamson’s counterfactual formalisation of thought experiments 
to deal with the possibility of an actually deviant realisation. If William-
son has problems with letting actually deviant realisations in, a fictional 
account drawing on Lewis’s analysis would have problems, too. Moreo-
ver, the counterfactual account of fiction threatens the fictional account 
with redundancy. One should expect that an outright counterfactual can 
replace the fiction in most philosophically relevant contexts.  
There are alternatives to Lewis’s analysis. In Kendall Walton’s 
(1990) pluralistic account, the explicit story functions as a prop. It invites 
us to engage in a game of make believe. One is authorised to make believe 
precisely the fictional truths, which are determined according to several 
conventional principles of generation. As Walton himself emphasises, 
truth in fiction is not a kind of truth [cf. Walton (1990), p. 42]. Walton’s 
principles of generation are not bound to ensure that the content of a 
make believe game can be mapped to propositional truths. Hence philoso-
phers who want fiction to provide the content of a thought experiment 
cannot use Lewis’s or Walton’s accounts but must come up with a pic-
ture of their own.3 The picture used by Ichikawa and Jarvis is rather min-
imalistic. I shall show that even this minimalistic picture leads to grievous 
doubts about the cognitive use of fiction.  
How do Ichikawa and Jarvis ensure that the set of fictional truths 
corresponds to the right set of possibilities? A key (but not sufficient) 
requirement is the following: for any coherent thought experimental sce-
nario, the set of truths which correspond to what is true in the descrip-
tion of the scenario, treated as an everyday fiction, must also be perfectly 
coherent, interpreted broadly as logical consistency and conceptual coherence. In 
other words, truth in fiction is subject to the same constraints of preserv-
ing conceptual and logical truths as modal reasoning [cf. Ichikawa and 
Jarvis (2009), p. 234; p. 237]. If we accept the idea of conceptual coher-
ence, this minimum requirement seems crucial to any account that 
somehow uses fiction to fix the content of a thought experiment. For as-
sume there is a thought experiment where the coherence constraint is 
not met. Some description is perfectly coherent when treated as a 
thought experiment but not as a fictional story. Then we would clearly 
be bound to settle for the coherent scenario in the philosophical argu-
ment. But Ichikawa and Jarvis’s procedure would lead us to diagnose an 
incoherence: the thought experiment fails because there is no coherent 
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proposition according to which what is true in the fiction is true tout 
court. This diagnosis would obviously be misplaced.  
Disregarding concerns about its sufficiency, I shall argue that even 
the minimum requirement of conceptual coherence is not always met. 
Constraints of conceptual and logical coherence are weaker and thus 
more easily overridden by other criteria in everyday fiction than in 
thought experiments. Fiction may not be arbitrarily incoherent, but it 
tolerates suitably embedded punctual incoherence. As Gregory Curry 
notes, one may write a fiction where it is explicitly told that someone has 
refuted Gödel’s theorem [cf. Currie (1990), p. 69]. So far there is no 
problem for the fictional account. The fiction is inconsistent, and so 
would be a corresponding thought experiment. The problem arises when 
the story is implicitly incoherent. 
One may write a fiction where it is not explicit (or entailed) but only 
implicitly true that someone has refuted Gödel’s theorem. Assume the au-
thor of the story wants to make vivid what a superb genius her protago-
nist Schmidt is. She elaborates the ceremony where Schmidt is awarded 
the Fields medal for having refuted Gödel’s theorem.4 If the story is suit-
ably told, no hoax, irony, or indication of error, we are quite ready to ac-
cept it as true according to the story that Schmidt has refuted Gödel’s 
theorem. Narrative plausibility (Velleman’s ‘aha; of course!’) trumps con-
ceptual coherence and logical consistency. But the same would not fol-
low in a literally identical thought experimental scenario where 
metaphysical possibility and a fortiori conceptual coherence are strictly to 
be preserved. One way of securing these constraints in the Smith story 
would be to interpret the story such that the laureate and the committee 
made a mistake. We are bound to an interpretation like this if coherence is 
non-negotiable but not in dealing with fiction.5  
In sum, the purported correspondence between fiction and thought 
experiments fails. What is perfectly coherent as a thought experiment 
may become incoherent as an everyday fiction.6 Although my argument 
is sufficient to shed doubt on the fictional account, there is a fallback po-
sition: one may claim that the requirement of conceptual coherence is 
fulfilled for any interesting philosophical thought experiment. For any 
such thought experiment, the corresponding everyday fiction is coherent. 
One concern is that it seems irresponsible to use fiction as long as there 
is no positive argument that this fallback position is correct. Instead of 
further pressing this concern, I shall test the fallback position by going 
through a concrete counterexample. My example will be fission cases. I 
shall evince how the fictional account may misconstrue the dialectics of 
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such cases. The outline of a fission case is the following: imagine a per-
son P0, whose brain is divided into two halves and implanted into two 
bodies; two normally functioning persons emerge, P1 and P2, who are 
psychologically continuous with P0. Consider the following story tem-
plate (I leave out the proper names to make a purely non-fictional read-
ing available)· 
 
T3 Someone undergoes fission. Both of the post-fission persons 
sincerely utter: ‘I remember the slightest details about my pre-fission 
life. I remember my early childhood, my grandparents when they 
were still alive (…story continues). 
 
In that story, drawing on psychological continuity, both protagonists P1 
and P2 seem to refer to P0 as ‘I’. It is a highly intricate and disputed 
question who, if anyone, is right. Before the dispute is settled, any partic-
ipant in the debate should read the scenario such as to preserve a coher-
ent common ground: P1 and P2 take themselves to be identical to P0. 
Any stronger claim to identity is suspicious of violating conceptual 
boundaries [Sattig (2012)]. If conceptual coherence is to be strictly pre-
served, one should eschew such a stronger claim as long as its conceptual 
coherence is doubtful. 
However, when we read T3 as a science fiction story, we do not 
seem bound by these philosophical considerations. If the self-image of 
the protagonists is sufficiently vivid, we may accept it as fictionally true 
that P1 was P0 and/or that P2 was P0. Still the story does not explicitly 
say so. Given these assumptions, we get a counterexample to the corre-
spondence thesis. Read within the constraints imposed on philosophical 
reasoning, T3 describes a perfectly coherent and possible scenario. But 
our reading of T3 as a science fiction story is not bound to be perfectly 
coherent. The reason is not that fiction is not principally bound by con-
ceptual coherence. It is bound to be coherent, other things being equal. 
But in the fission case, other things are not equal. The relevant concep-
tual constraints are so subtle that only a thorough philosophical inquiry 
of fission cases and the like discloses them. One cannot be expected to 
observe them in competently evaluating a normal science fiction story. 
Science fiction may invite highly sophisticated conceptual distinctions, 
but that would require more subtle clues than a simple fission scenario as 
used in philosophy. One may wonder how one can even grasp the story 
if it is not in tune with our notion of personal identity. One way to ac-
count for our grasp would be to draw on an initial understanding which 
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does not require a full mastery of any subtle conceptual truth about per-
sonal identity. 
However, shouldn’t the author’s intention of presenting a coherent 
story constrain our interpretation of the fiction such as to prevent the in-
coherent reading? No, that intention is irretrievably bound to the aim of 
presenting a philosophical argument. But that aim is blinded out when 
the story is treated as an everyday fiction.  
One last fallback position would be the following: only successful 
thought experiments show a perfect correspondence with a literally iden-
tical story, and the success of the fission story is contestable. But given 
the difficulty of singling out a successful thought experiment, this 
fallback option smells of an immunisation strategy. 
I conclude that the fictional account is flawed. Fiction is not well-
regulated enough to be used in a general analysis of Gettier-like thought 
experiments. In how far are these results paradigmatic? Firstly, our com-
petence of closing in on the right fictional scenarios is parasitic on a 
competence of imposing normalcy conditions. Generalising, any candi-
date for a specific cognitive achievement of fiction is suspicious of being 
an epistemic detour because it is parasitic on other epistemic capacities 
which are of use outside of fiction and can as well be independently acti-
vated without invoking fiction. Secondly, fiction is not well-behaved 
philosophically. It makes things narratively plausible which are not plau-
sible in the sober environment of a philosophical argument. Not even a 
scenario which would be perfectly coherent as a philosophical thought 
experiment has to be logically and conceptually coherent, taken as an 
everyday fiction. But if narrative plausibility may trump even a minimum 
condition like logical and conceptual coherence, use of ordinary fiction 
in philosophical reasoning seems deeply problematic. 
I close with a note in caution: none of my results preclude that we 
may come up with highly regulated philosophical pieces of fiction, as in 
the many variants of philosophical fictionalism. However, even concern-
ing this highly regulated use, there is a suspicion that, to the extent that it 
simply relies on our everyday capacity of dealing with ordinary fictions, it 
may be infected by the latter’s irregularities. 
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NOTES  
 
1 Ichikawa and Jarvis consider using fiction as a reference fixer for a 
demonstrative ‘things are like that...’. One may doubt that they are committed to 
a mapping from fictional truths to truths. But I reckon such a mapping the only 
way of ensuring that g selects the right possibilities. 
2 Malmgren criticises that such clauses cannot be cashed out [Malmgren 
(2011), pp. 286-7]. But it is not clear that we must be able to cash them out as 
long as we are able to recognise deviant completions of a recipe when we en-
counter them. Be that as it may, I do not claim that a normalcy clause solves the 
problem, just that it does as well as a fiction. If the normalcy clause cannot be 
cashed out, the same goes for truth in fiction. 
3 I do not reckon more recent accounts of fictional truth fit for the task. 
Nichols and Stich (2000), understood most charitably, construe fictional truth 
by a process of revising one’s actual belief system by the explicit story. But since 
it does not follow from our beliefs that Tl is not deviantly realised, e.g. as T2, 
this won’t help to close in on non-deviant scenarios. Other accounts do not 
seem promising either [overview in Alward (2009)]. For instance, they often 
come up with an ideal author or audience. But ‘ideal’ is not understood as ‘ideal 
for the purposes of a philosophical argument’. 
4 It is important that ‘for ...’ is read intensionally: the prize committee’s 
opinion that Schmidt has refuted Gödel’s theorem is their reason why they 
award him the medal. For related examples [van Inwagen (1998), p. 79, Kung 
(2016), p. 96]. 
5 I have been reminded that for instance in an ethical trolley experiment 
where the issue is whether to save Schmidt, who actually refuted Gödel’s Theo-
rem, or three other people, we might prefer to accept that Schmidt has refuted 
Gödel’s Theorem. But this is only because we see that this feature is irrelevant 
to the story. My suspicion is that we practice some sort of double-accounting. 
We officially stick to the story, but we ignore the weird but transparently idle de-
tail when it comes to evaluating the argument. 
6 I have encountered doubts about the idea of a ‘literally identical’ descrip-
tion, read as a thought experiment and as a fictional story. But the intuitive idea 
is plausible: T1 can of course be read as part of an epistemological argument. 
And our conventions of telling fictional stories seem flexible enough to embed 
T1 into a speech-act of story-telling (which may be represented by adding an 
‘according to the fiction’-operator). 
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